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1:)_  •.. By  letter of  5  July 1968  the  President of  the  European  Parliament 
invited  the  Legal Affairs committee,  at the  request of  the  Committee  on 
External  Trade  Relations,  to report  on  the  legal aspects  of participation 
by  the European  Communities  in  the work  of  the  various  UN  bodies. 
On  18  October  1968,  the  Legal Affairs  Committee  appointed 
Mr  Dehousse  rapporteur.  After  the latter had  ceased  to be  a  Member  of  the 
European  Parliament,  the  Committee  appointed Mr  Ballardin  .:;_  rapporteur  on 
13  September  1971. 
It examined  the draft report at its meetings of  7  December  1972, 
8  March,  13 April _and  2  May  1973. 
The  motion  for  a  resolution  and  the  accompanying  explanatory 
statement were  approved at the meeting  of  2  May  1973 by 11 votes in favour 
and  4  abstentions. 
The  following were present:  Mr Vermeylen,  acting chairman; 
Mr  Ballardini,  rapporteur:  Mr  Armengaud,  Mr  Bangemann,  Mr  Brewis,  Mr  Broeksz, 
Mr  Brugger,  Mr  D
1Angelosante,  Mr  Heger,  Mrs  Nielsen,  Mr  Outers,  Mr  Scelba, 
Mr  Schmidt,  Mr  Schw~rer,  Sir Derek Walker-Smith. 
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The  Legal Affairs Committee  hereby  submits  to the  European Parliament 
the  following motion  for  a  resolution,  together with explanatory statement: 
MOTION  FOR  A RESOLUTION 
on  the legal aspects of participation by the 
European  communi ties in the work of the  various  UN  bodies 
The  European  Parliament, 
having regard  to the Treaties establishing the European  Communities  and in 
particular Article  6  of the ECSC  Treaty,  Article 184 of the EAEC  Treaty 
and Articles  113,  210  and  229  o! the EEC  Treaty, 
-having regard to the  fact that the European Communities-have  an  interna-
tional legal personality, 
having regard to  the need to strengthen the presence of the Communities  in 
the  various international bodies in order  to foster  a  united image  of 
Europe, 
having regard to  the  fact that the European  Communities have  sole responsi-
bility for  certain matters in  the area of external relations, 
-having regard to the  fact that the extension of the-Communities'. internal 
powers  must be  accompanied by  a  parallel increase in its external powers, 
-having regard to  the fact that the communities'  external powers  have  not 
so  far been fully recognized in the context of UN  activities, 
-having regard to the report of the Legal Affairs committee  (Dac.  57/73), 
1.  Affi~ms the principle that the European  Community  mu~t be recognized as 
a  single entity in all international bodies; 
2 ..  Stresses that the European  Cottununity  alone  can enter into obligations 
with third countries in matters which  are its sole responsibility and 
guarantee their fulfilment; 
3.  Points out that it is therefore in the interests of third countries,  for 
their  own  legal security,  to negotiate with  the European Community on  mat-
ters which are no  longer within  the  sovereignty of the Member  States; 
4.  Notes  that in regard to participation by the European  Community  in  the 
activities of the United Nations Organization,  the  solutions adopted are 
unsatisfactory and  sometimes  fail to comply with  the letter and spirit of 
the Community treaties; 
- 5  - PE  31.983/fin. 5.  Believes that the Charter of  the United Nations  and  the Statutes of  its 
specialized bodies  and agencies  do  not  in themselves preclude on practical 
and procedural levels,  participation by  the  European  Community  as  such  in 
certain activities undertaken in the UN,  as is proved by the practical 
solutions adopted up  to  now; 
6.  Considers  for its part that the failure to make  appropriate arrangements 
in this matter complying with the Community  Treaties can be attributed to 
the lack of political will in the Member  States rather  than  to obstacles 
of a  legal  nat~e; 
7.  Therefore urges  the Commission  and council to adopt a  clear  and precise 
position on  this matter and refer it if necessary to the United Nations 
Assembly; 
8.  Instructs its President to  forward  this resolution  an~ the accompanying 
report to  the Council and Commission  of the  Europe~n Communities. 




EXPLANATORY  STATEMENT 
I.  Subject of the ~ 
1.  The  subject Of ·this study is both important and delicate.  It concerns 
participation by  the European communities  in the work of the  various  UN 
bodies.  Behind  the  technicalities, it is easy to  see the  legal and politi-
cal aspects of this problem;  the implications are in fact political rather 
than  legal  and of historical significance.  What  is at stake is the process 
of consolidation Of  the international legal personality of the  Community 
institutions which is not only separate  from  the  legal personality of the 
Member  States but  sometimes  replaces  the latter. 
It is safe  to  say that all convinced Europeans hope  this process will 
come  to fruition.  The  task of your  committee is simply to examine  the  legal 
implications of the existing treaties and international statutes.  But  this 
study will be made  from  the angle of observers who  have  their sights  fixed 
on  a  far  more  ambitious ultimate aim. 
2.  The  precise problem with which we  are concerned here was  first broached 
in written  question  No.  298  of 26  January 1968,  by Mr  Berkhouwer  to the 
Council.  His  question was  put on  the eve of the United Nations Conference 
on  Trade  and Development due  to be held from  1  February to 25 March  1968 in 
New  Delhi;  Mr  Berkhouwer  asked whether  the Council felt 'that for matters 
relating to the  Community  sector,  the positions adopted by  the Community as 
such would  alone be valid while  in other areas  the attitudes of Member  States 
should as  far  as  ~ossible be harmonized'.  He  went to ask whether  the Council 
considered that  'by analogy with the procedure adopted during  the multilate-
ral conference in  GATT,  the commission  should  speak  for  the community  on all 
matters relating to the community sector'. 
The  Council,  Which  had already had many  occasions  to consider  this prob-
lem,  replied to Mr  Berkhouwer  on  8  April  19681  two  weeks·after  the close of 
the New  Delhi  conference;  but the reply lost none of its topicality because 
it dealt with matters of general and continuing interest.  The  Council  sta-
ted that it endorsed the  views  put in the parliamentary  ~estion and  added 
that these  views had always been  taken  into consideration in  the past and 
that in the case of extra-community problem·s,  harmonization of the positions 
of Member  States had been guaranteed by preliminary consultation between 
representatives. of the Member  states and commission;  this consultation had 
also been extended to representatives of the Associated States.  The  Council 
document went on  to point out,  perhaps going beyond the  subject of the 
1
oJ C  36,  22  April 1968
1  p.  7 
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question,  that the  spokesman  for  the Community had been either  the President 
of the Council  or  the representative of the Commission  'depending  on  practi-
cal agreements  reached  jointly during  such conferences';  this did not apply 
'in the case of tariff negotiations in  the strict sense of the  term'  since 
here  'only the Commission  could act as  spokesman  for  the Community'. 
3.  The  reference by  the Council  in its reply to previous instances in 
which the Community  as  such had acted on behalf of its Member  States,  rela-
ted in particular. to  the Convention  of 18  May  1967  signed in Geneva  between 
the  EEC  and ll other countries,  on  the basis of which  the Community  under-
took  to supply a  certain quantity of cereals to the  developing countries as 
food aid.  In  a  report which he drafted on  this matter  on  behalf of the 
Committee  on Agriculture
1
,  Mr  Vredeling stressed that this Convention had 
for  the first time offered the  Community  as  such  the opportunity of granting 
food aid on  a  strictly Community basis.  He  stressed the twofold  importance 
of this occurence:  the Community nature of this international commitment 
had been maintained in the  implementing procedures  and it had given  an  oppor-
tunity to make  ~e population of the developing countries aware  of the Com-
munity as  an  entity. 
4.  It was,  however,  the Committee  on  External Trade Relations which,  in 
its opinion of 16 May  1968  on  the first general report on  the activities of 
the Commission2,  referring to  the results of the New  Delhi conference, 
expressed its belfef that the European  Parliament should make  a  detailed 
study of the· problems raised by EEC  participation in the work  of the various 
UN  bodies.  On  25  June,  Mr  Kriedemann,  then chairman of the Committee  on 
External Trade Relations,  notified the President of the  ~uropean Parliament_ 
of the wish  expressed by his committee  and the  President entrusted the Legal 
Affairs Committee,· pursuant to the Rules  of Procedure,  with the task of 
examining  this important matter. 
5.  A  further  document  issued a  few  days  later,  helped to clarify the vari-
ous  aspects of this matter.  This was  the report by  the Committee on-Exter-
nal  Trade Relations  on  the  outcome of the  second Session of UNCTAD3•  It 
noted  'with satisfaction the unity of views  evinced at the  conference by  the 
Member  States,  while regretting that once again the  Six were unable to act 
as  a  single entity and that the  Commission  of the Communities  had not been 
entrusted with  the task of acting as  a  joint spokesman  for  the Member  States 
at least in  those  sectors which are already the  sole responsibility of the 
1ooc.  31/68:  resolution adopted by  the European Parliament-on  15  May  1968, 
OJ  C  55,  5  June  1968 
2opinion  of Mr  Bersani  - PE  10.849/rev. 
3Report by Mr  Pedini  - Doc.  86/68;  resolution adopted by the European Parlia-
ment  on  4  July 1968  - OJ  C  72,  19  July 1968 
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This report outlined the reasons  for  satisfaction with  the unity of 
views  shown  by the ·national delegations of the  Six at 28  coordinating 
meetings  and other meetings  for  consultation and exchange of information 
with delegations  from  the Associated States. 
However,  it regretted the fact that the  six delegations had intervened 
individually in  the debates  and  that the role of joint spokesman  for  sectors 
which were already the  sole responsibility of the Community  (tariff policy, 
agricultural policy,  association conventions,  common  commerc~al agreements) 
had not been entrusted- contrary to  the  European  Parliament's request- to 
the Commission of the communities:  'The  President in Offi9e of the Council 
spoke  officially on behalf of the  Community  in the general debate.  The  Com-
mission representative was  riot empowered  to intervene  on  behalf of the Corn-· 
munity'. 
The  Committee  on  External Trade Relations had good reason  to express its 
regret since at the end of 1968  in  a  resolution on preparations  for  the 
second Session of UNCTAD1,  it had put forward  the following  suggestions: 
'1.  ~ne Committee  considers it essential for  the _Europe  of Six to act as  a 
single entity at the  second Session of the United Nations Conference  on  Trade 
and  Development;  2.  urges  that,  for  the  sectors in respect of which  the com-
munity already has  sole responsibility (tariff policy,  agri~ultural policy, 
association conventions  or  common  commercial  agreements),  the role of joint 
spokesman  for  the six Member  States at the world conference be entrusted to 
the  Commission of.the Communities;  3.  recommends  that for all other  sectors 
of joint interest the Member  States define  a  common  position to be put by a 
single  spokesman'. 
On  the  third point,  the parliamentary committee was  able to indicate 
its satisfaction after the event.  But it could not do  so  on  the  second point 
even  though,  as we  know  from  the reply given  to Mr  Berkhouwer,  the Commission 
was  in agreement.  Why  then did things work  out differently?  Did  the Council 
have  a  different view?  Were  the provisions of the  UN  Charter  or  Community 
Treaties  an  obstacle? 
6.  The  legal difficulties deriving  from  the  UN  Charter have recently been 
indicated by the Commission  of the Community. 
1 
Report by Mr  Pe.dini  - Doc.  177/67;  resolution adopted by the  European Parli-
ament  on  24  January 1968  - OJ  c  10,  14 February 1968 
- 9  - PE  31. 983/fin. '  ;  : 
On  12  January 1971,  Mr  Vredeling put a  question  to the Commission  with 
a  view to ascertaining its opinion on  the  'desirability and possibility for 
the  Community  to belong as  a  body  to the United Nations  Food  and Agriculture 
Organization' •  The Commission replied on  23  February1 · in very cautious 
terms,  indicating its favour  for  'adequate'  participation by the Community 
in  the FAO's  activities but pointing to  the  'various institutional difficul-
ties connected with  the statute of the United Nations'. 
7.  The institutional difficulties referred to by the Commission  stem speci-
fically  from contradictions between  the United Nations  Char·cer which  recog-
nizes only individual States and Article  228  of the Treaty establishing the 
EEC2• 
In  fact,  according  to  the Commission's reply,  participation by  the Euro-
pean  communities  in the work  of the various  UN  organizations was  a  practical 
aim because the conferences of these organizations dealt with international 
problems in specific sectors of the  economy,  trade,  agriculture,  food  supp-
lies,  etc.  More  often than not these conferences  took. the  form of negotia-
tions  leading up  to agreements which  laid down  obligations  for  the signato-
ries.  As  this was  the nature of their work,  it followed that the  commission 
must  particip~te since Article  228  of the· Treaty of Rome  requires  agreements 
between  the Community and one  or more  States to be  'negotiated by  the Com-
mission •.  Whenever  UN  bodies hold conferences  to deal with matters which 
fall within the  terms  of reference of the Community-,  the Commission must 
participate together with· each Member  State.  And  the procedure and delega-
tion of powers indicated in Article  228  must apply to the conclusion of these 
1 OJ  c  22,  9  March  1971,  p.  9 
2Article  228 
1.  Where  this Treaty provides  for  the conclusion of agreements between  the 
Community  and one  or  more  States or  an  international organization,  such 
agreements  shall be negotiated by the Commission.  Subject to  the  powers 
vested in the Commission  in this field,  such  agreements shall be  concluded 
by  the Council,  after consulting the Assembly where required by this Treaty. 
The  Council,  the Commission  or  a  Member  State may  obtain beforehand 
the opinion of the Court of Justice as  to whether  an  agreement envisaged is 
compatible with  the provisions of this Treaty.  Where  the  opinion of the 
Court of Justice is adverse,  the  agreement may  enter into  force  only in 
accordance with Article 236. 
2.  Agreements  concluded under  these conditions shall be binding  on  the 
institutions of the Community and  on  Member  States. 
PE  31.983 /fin. 
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1  iL  turn recognizes  the Comrnission•s  right to 
maintain  •appropriate relations•  with  the  United Nations bodies.  The  United 
Nations is defined in its Charter  as  an  organization of States  and reserva-
tions have  frequently been  entered against the  full participation in its 
bodies  and conferences· of various groupings between  States which  belong to 
the organization. 
8.  The  conflict between the Treaty of Rome  which  confers  on  the  Commission, 
within certain precise limits,  the right to represent the  six Member  States, 
and the United Nations Charter,  therefore illustrates the  legal difficulties 
which have had to be  faced. 
9.  The  embarrassmen.t  to the Community resulting from  the legal difficulty 
in acting as  a  single body in UN  agencies has  become  even  more  acute  since 
the end of the transitional period.  From  that time  onwards,  by virtue of 
Article  113  of the EEC  Treaty2,  all aspects of trade between· Member  States and 
third countries have  come  under  the responsibility of the Community.  The 
definition of commercial policy in Article 113  is so wide  that the occasions 
on  which  the Community must act in place of the Member  States are bound  to 
become  more  numerous. 
1Article 229 
It shall be  for  the Commission  to ensure the maintenance of ·all approp-
riate relations with -the  organs of the United Nations,  of its specialized 
agencies  and of the·General Agreement on  Tariffs and Trade. 
The  Commission  shall also maintain  such relations as  are appropriate 
with all international organizations. 
2Article lt3 
1.  After  the  transitional period has  ended,  the  common  commercial policy 
shall be based on  uniform principles,  particularly in regard to changes in 
tariff rates,  the conclusion of tariff and  trade agreements,  the achieve-
ment of uniformity in measures of liberalization,  export policy and measures 
to protect trade such as  those  to be  taken in case of  durnpin~ or  subsidies. 
2.  The Commission  shall  submit proposals to the Council  for  implementing 
the common  commercial policy. 
3.  Where  agreements with third countries need to be negotiated,  the Com-
mission  shall make  recommendations  to the Council,  which  shall authorize 
the Corranission  to  op_en  the necessary negotiations. 
The  Commission  shall conduct these negotiations  in consultation with  a 
special committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission  in this 
task  and within  the  framework  of such directives as  the Council may  issue 
to it. 
4.  In exercising the powers  conferred upon it by this Article,  the Council 
shall act by a  qualified majority. 
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responsible were  limited  (tariff agreements,  agricultural policy);  but since 
the  end of that period the range of the common  commercial policy has widened 
enormously.  In fact commercial policy embraces all measures  aimed at regula-
ting economic relations with  third countries1• 
It comprises  trade with third countries without any  limitation as  to  the 
goods  involved;  non-tariff barriers to international trade;  industrial, 
health and safety standards as well as  packaging and labelling rules which 
also influence external trade;  agreements relating  to  the prevision of ser-
vices;  association agreements  and  food aid.  On  all these matters,  the Commis-
sion is empowered  to participate in preparatory work  and in  the actual nego-
tiations;  for  this purpose it replaces  the delegations of Member  States. 
In this connection,  the root of the problem did not lie in the  choice of 
the body which would have  full powers  to represent the Community  in the vari-
ous  phases of preparatory work,  negotiations and conclusions of agreements. 
On  this particular aspect the Treaty is sufficiently explicit.  The  problem 
lay in the need to recognize that on  certain matters  (and as we  have  seen 
these matters are many  and  varied}  the  Community alone,  and not the Member 
States individually,  could now  enter into valid commitments with third coun-
i:r.:Les.  If Member  States have an interest in acquiring certain rights and 
guarantees in .this. area  they must agree to contract appropriate provisions 
with  the Community;  this implies admission of the Community .among  the con  trac-
ting parties. 
10.  The principle outlined above has been  solemnly confirmed by  a  ruling of 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities,  i.e. Ruling No.  22/702  on 
an  action by the Commission against a  decision of the Council.  This ruling 
is extremely important,  both because it reaffirmed the principle of the  sole 
power  of the Community  to conclude international agreements  in certain  areas 
and because it provided  a  wide  and in  a  certain sense  new  criterion for  deter-
mination of the .areas to which  this power  should apply. 
The  sole power  of the Community  to contract international agreements  in 
areas specifically indicated in  the Treaty  (tariff agreements,  common  agri-
cultural policy,  commercial policy in  the wide  sense referred to above)  was 
implicitly reco~nized.  In practice,  however,  these wide powers  have not been 
exercised solely by the Community  either  for  internal poli·tical reasons  or  for 
political and  legal reasons external  to  the  Communities  themselves. 
1Pescatore,  Recueil  des  cours a l'Acad~ie de  droit international de  La  Haye, 
21961-II,  p.  85 
Raccolta della giurisprudenza della Corte,  Volume  XVII-1971/3  p.  263 
- 12  - PE  31.983/fin. But opinions  differed on  the  question as  to whether ·this sole  power  of 
the Community  could be  extended  to cases other  than  those  expressly referred 
to  in  the Treaty.  The  ruling quoted  above  fully vindicated the  theory that 
in  this area  the community not only had powers  specifically vested in it by 
the Treaty,  but also 
1 implicit powers 
1
•  The. ruling reads  as  follows  on  this 
point: 
'In order  to ascertain,  in a  specific instance,  whether  the Community is 
empowered to conclude international agreements,  it is necessary to consider 
the Treaty as  a  whole  and also its individual provisions.  This  power  need 
not in every case be expressly provided  for  in the Treaty -·as is the case, 
e.g.  in Article 113  and  114  for  tariff and commercial  agreements  and in Arti-
cle 238  for  Association Agreements  - but may be derived -from  other provisi-
ons in the Treaty and acts adopted by  the  Community institutions by virtue of 
such provisions.  ·In particular,  whenever  (with  a  view to implementing  a 
common  policy stipulated in the Treaty}  the Community has  adopted provisions 
containing,  in· any  form whatever,  common  norms,  the Member  States no  longer 
have  the power  - either individually or collectively - to contract commit-
ments with  third countries which  encroach  on  these norms.  As  more  norms  of 
this kind are adopted,  the  Communi ty
1 s  power  to enter into and  implement  - in 
the internal area  on which  Community  legislation is binding - commitments 
with third countries will increase.  In consequence,  when  considering the 
Treaty provisions it is not possible to isolate arrangements  internal to the 
Community  from provisions governing external relations. 
1
. 
This extract shows  that the ruling ·endorsed the  theory that 
the Community  I  s  e~ercise of internal power.s  gives rise to corresponding exter-
nal  powers,  thus  accepting the notion of  'implicit powers'  which remain  in-
stitutionally •  s·eparate  and different from  the 
1 new  powers 
1  which may  be  as-
1  signed to the institutions by virtue of Article  235  of the Treaty  . 
The  assertion of this parallel link between  the  internal powers  and 
external powers  of the  Community vastly extends  the practical importance of 
the problem which  therefore merits  a  full study by the Legal Affairs Committee 
and  a  clear statement by the European  Parliament in accordance with  the  letter 
and spirit of the Community  treaties. 
1Article  235 
If action by the Community  should prove necessary  to attain,  in  the 
course of the operation of the Common  Market,  one of the objectives of the 
Community  and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers,  the Council 
shall,  acting unanimously  on  a  proposal  from  the Commission  and after con-
sulting the Assembly,  take  the appropriate measures.  · 
PE  31. 983/fin. 
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,  'I. <• II.  Legal personality and negotiating capacity of the  European  Conununities  in 
the international context 
11.  In  order  to answer  our basic question, it is first necessary to deter-
mine whether  the European  Conununi ties have  a  legal personality of their  own 
and  to define  the extent of their negotiating capacity at international level. 
12.  There can be no  doubt that the Community has  an  international legal per-
sonality.  Article  6  of the Treaty establishing the ECSC  states:  'The Commu-
nity shall have  legal personality.  In international relations;  the Community 
shall enjoy the  legal capacity it requires  to perform its functions  and attain 
its objectives ••.•  The .community shall be represented by its institutions, 
each within  the  limits of its powers.' 
Article 184 of the  EAEC  Treaty also expressly states that the  Community. 
shall have  a  legal personality. 
A  similar affirmation is made  in Article  210  of the EEC  Treaty. 
Recognition of this personality by third countries is not an essential 
requirement because.the Treaty provisions have an  independent effect.  There 
is,  therefore,  no need ·to examine  this problem further. 
13.  It should,  howeve~, be pointed out that the existence of the Community's 
international legal personality was  affirmed by  the  European  Parliament in 
a  resolution which it approved on  19  November  1960
1 
on  the basis of  a  supple-
mentary report by Mr  Van  der  Goes  van  Naters  on behalf of the  then  Commi ttce 
for  Political Affairs.and Institutional Problems,  on  matters arising  in  con-
nection with relations between  the  Community  and  third countries,  with  spe-
cial reference  to  the  law on  legations and  flags. 
In this resolution,  the European  Parliament maintained that the European 
Communities  enjoy,  through  their international legal personality,  the right 
to  send and receive legations. 
This right,  and accordingly the  legal personality of the Communities, 
has been recognized.by many  third countries which  have accredited diplomatic 
missions  to  the Communities  and declared their willingness  to receive per-
manent missions  from  i·t. 
If on  the other hand  the Council of Ministers has  failed to implement 
its decision of 1  February 1960,  providing for  the delegation of joint mis-
sions  from  the  Communities  to  the governments of third countries,  the 
l 
OJ  79,  16  December  1960,  p.  1496 
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underlying reason has been  one  of internal politics. 
{b)  ~~92!~~!~~~-£~P~£~~y 
14.  After  thus  settling the question of the European  Communities'  legal  per-
sonality,  we  must  now  define  the extent of its authority to act. 
The  literature on  which  the concept of  the  indivisibility of  sovereignty 
is based  does  not accept ·that,  in  the present stage of development of inter-
national organizations,  there can be  subjects of international  law  other  than 
individual States; it is held that unions  of States  do  not. have  an  inter-
national  'capacity'  but only  a  'competence'  which  such  unions  can exercise 
only as  a  colle.ctive body of the Member  States. 
The  question as  to  the precedence of the concepts  of  'capacity'  or 
'competence'  may,· howe.ver,  be disregarded,  since,  in defining  the  area in 
which international organizations may  conclude  internatio~al treaties,. it is 
irrelevant whether~this activity is considered to reflect a  'capacity'  or  a 
1  simple  'competence'  • 
15.  It is desirable to point out at this  stage that the capacity of inter-
national  organizations  to conclude  international treaties has been admitted 
in practice through recognition of their international personality2 
The  extent of this capacity is determined solely by  int~rpretation of 
the statute of the international organization concerned. 
In principle,  therefore,  the possibility of recognizing  for  an  interna...; 
tional organization external powers  - not expressly laid down  - in areas in 
respect of which its internal constitution provides no  specific normative 
powers, can be ruled out. 
On  the other hand,  this possibility may  be  admitted when  the  external 
powers are directly linked with the internal normative powers. 
16.  In regard to the external powers  of the Community in particular,  the 
Treaties establishing the Communities  stipulated two  separate solutions.  The 
first in  the  ECSC  and  EAEC  Treaties is based  on  a  general attribution of 
powers  linked with the purposes of the Treaties or  the authority of each of 
these  Communities;  the  second,  i.e. in the case of the  EEC  Treaty,  is based 
on  the attribution of external powers  in specific areas  (Articles  111  and  113 
for  commercial policy and  customs  tariffs,  Article  238  for  the association 
with third countries,  Articles 229,  230  and  231  for relations with interna-
tional organizations). 
GORI,  Sulla competenza negoziale esterna delle organizzazioni  intergoverna-
tive con particolare riguardo alle Comunia  europee,  in.Rivista di diritto 
2europe,  No.  2/1972  p.  156 
SCHNEIDER,  Treaty-making  power  of international organizations,  1959,  p.  129 
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general attribution of negotiating powers  to communities  such  as  the  ECSC 
and  EAEC  with restricted powers  does not entail the risk of serious conflicts 
of authority with Member  States.  If,  on  the other hand,  similar  general 
powers  had been conferred on  the  EEC,  a  situation which would have been  unac-
ceptable to the Member  States would have arisen,  in view of the extent of the 
internal powers of this Community1 
However,  the progressive widening of the EBC's  internal powers  as  a 
result of the  development of common  policies in various  sectors which has not 
been  accompanied by a  par~llel development of external powers,  has  created a 
situation of uncertainty regarding the division of powers  between  the Communi-
ty and  the Member  States. 
It is  th~refore possible that because of this uncertainty,  third coun-
tries and international organizations may  have hesitations in concluding 
international  ~greements with the Community,  without the guarantee of Member 
States2• 
Experience has,  however,  shown  that the main  obstacle to  the  development 
of the Cmmnunity's external relations stems  from its own  Member  States which 
ara reluctant to assign a  substantial part o.f  their powers  to the Community. 
Because of.this situation,  recourse has  sometimes been had e.g.  in the 
association conventions,  to a  'mixed'  procedure  - for  which  no  prov~s~on is 
made  in the Treaty - on  the basis of which Member  States have  signed,  jointly 
with the community,  the corresponding international agreements establishing 
legal relations between  the Community  as  such and  third countries,  although 
under Article 238  of the  EEC  Treaty,  the Community  should have been  the  sole 
contracting party. 
In justification of this procedure it was  argued' that the association 
agreements  involved  financial  obligations which had  a  direct bearing on  the 
budgets of individual Member  States of the Community.  In addition,  these 
agreements  provide  for  the creation of institutions with decision-making 
powers which  go beyond  the external powers  of the community in  the area of 
trade3 • 
1MEGRET,  Le  pouvoir  de  la CEE  de  conclure des  accords  internationaux,  in 
2Revue  du  Marchl!  commun,  1964,  p.  530. 
ZORGBIBE,  L'Europe  de  l'Est face  au  March~ commun,  Paris 1970,  p ..  12,  26 
et seq. 
3
RAux,  Les relations exterieures  de  la  Communaut~ economique  europl!enne, 
Paris 1966,  pp.  452,  453 .. 
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This  argument might have  been  valid in  the  case of financial  obligations 
while  the  Community's budget was  funded  by national  contributions.  The  situa-
tion will,  however,  change altogether when  the  Community's budget consists 
solely of own  resources,  i.e. after 1975.  On  the  other hand  the  argument 
which has been invoked concerning the creation of institutions  endowed with 
decision-making  powers  is less convincing.  But we  shall not examine  that 
specific problem in this report. 
17.  In order  to better define  the negotiating powers  of the  Community at 
international level, it is now  necessary to distinguish between three categories 
of responsibility,.  i.e.  for  the  implementation of a  common  policy in a  speci-
fic  area  (agricultural policy,  commercial  policy,  transport policy)i  for 
matters which  are also governed by national regulations  (competition policy), 
and  for  action necessary to pursue  the aims of the Treaty,  e.g.  in the  social 
sector,  even  though  such action has no direct link with a  common  policy or  an 
independent  ar~a governed by specific legal relations1• 
The  powers  covered by  the first category which  the Community  derives 
directly  from  the Treaty are basically instrumental rather  than material in 
form,  in the  sense  t.ba·t  the Treaty refers to  the procedures by which  the Com-
mun~ties may  make  independent arrangements  for  specific  ar~as within  the 
framework  of the c-on policyi  here the treaty does  not lay down  precise pro-
visions but confines· itself to the  statement of general  aims. 
However,  once  a  Community  norm has been  adopted it replaces the corres-
ponding national norms2•  There is therefore an  equivalent reduction in the 
power  of the national legislator.  Consequently in the sphere of common  exter-
nal relations,  the Member  States can no  longer  enter into commitments  whose 
implementation  they could not guarantee. 
In  the  second category,  distribution of powers  is easier  since the clear 
distinction made  by  the Treaty between relations governed.by Community  law 
and  relations subject.to national  law,  does not generally grant an  extension 
of the Community's  external powers  to the detriment of those pertaining to 
the  individual Member  States. 
However,.  external negotiating powers  may  be granted to the Community  to 
the extent that they are necessary  for  the exercise of its internal powers 
provided that there is no  interference between  the  two  spheres,  i.e.  commu-
nity and national. 
1
GORI,  ibid,  p.  183 
2 
WOHLFARTH,  Fondements  juridiques des relations entre les 
P~ennes et les Etats-Unis  Institut d'Etudes  europ~ennes 
libre  de Bruxelles,  1964:  p.  19 
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PE  31.983 /fin. In regard  to  the  third category of powers  which  concerns  the coordina-
tion rather  than replacement of national norms,  the prevailing legal  theory 
is that the  Community has  no negotiating powers  in  the strict sense of the 
term since internal discipline remains  exclusively a  matter  for  national 
authorities. 
18.  In conclusion therefore we  may  state.  in accordance with Ruling No.  22/70 
of the Court of Justice referred to above,  that it is not sufficient for 
there to be  an  internal  •competence'  for  the Community  to automatically have 
a  parallel external  'competence'.  On  the other hand in sectors which  are,  or 
will be,  governed by a  common  policy  (agriculture,  customs  tariffs,  commerce 
and  transport),  the States will no  longer have  unilateral decision-making 
~ewers either internally or  externally. 
III. Relations between  the Community  and  the  UN 
19.  This being the situation regarding the division of external  negotiating 
powers  between.the  Community  as  such  and  the  Member  States~  what  practi:cal 
consequences  may be  drawn in connection more  specifically with relations bet-
ween  the  Community  and the UN? 
20.  As  we  have  seen,  the Community Treaties contain provisions granting exc-
lusive powers  to the  Community in  the  area of external relations.  e.g.  Article 
lll of the  EEC  Treaty  (tariff negotiations)  and Article 238  of the  same  Treaty 
(association  agreements). 
With  the end of the transitional period these  exclusive powers  have been 
considerably increased.  Commercial policy  (Article 113)  has been  added  to  the 
cases listed above.  But what is the extent of this policy? 
Article 113(1)  defines its scope as  follows:  commercial policy comprises 
in particular changes  in tariff rates,  the conclusion of tariff and  trade 
agreements.  the  achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalization, 
export policy and measures  to protect trade. 
21.  It now happens  that when  the  UN  or its specialized agencies  convene 
international conferences  on  measures  of development aid.  trade,  tariffs,  etc. 
and Member  States·as well  as  the Community as  such are  invited to attend,  a 
conflict arises between  the provisions outlined above  and  the Charter  of the 
United Nations.  Under  these provisions  the Community institutions,  namely 
the  Cornrnission_and  the Council,  are competent to negotiate and  conclude inter-
national  agreements  in  the appropriate areas and-to accept the  corresponding 
obligations.  On  the  other hand  the  United Nations Charter only admits  Member 
States of the Community  to active participation in  such conferences,  since 
the United Nations is an  association  of States. 
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~ I  2?  This conflict has  of  course  arisen  many  times;  up  to  now it has  been 
reHol  ved  by  special  accommodations.  However,  the  so1 ut  .. i.on.s  adopted 
have  all been  based  on  compromises  and  do  not  satisfy·  the provisions of our 
Treaties.  In  some  cases the Community has  been  granted a  status equivalent 
to  rather more  than  that of a  simple observer but less  than  that of a  full 
State.  This  means  that the  Commission  has  been  entitled to  speak  on behalf 
of Member  StateS
1  delegations while  the latter have .had  the  final  voting 
right.  In other instances  the Community has  been  admitted only as  an  obser-
ver  or by special invitation.  The  particular Community body entitled to 
attend or  speak  in  the various organizations has  also differed  from  case  to 
case.  Of course  the differences in the arrangements  and  above all between 
the bodies admitted  (Commission,  Council or  Secretariat)·'depends on  the  sub-
ject matter  dealt with on  the various  occasions  and  on  the extent to which it 
falls within  the Community's  terms  of reference. 
23.  To  illustl;"ate  the problem in practical terms it may  be useful  to recall 
what happened  during  the .united Nations  Sugar  Conference. in 1968.  This  exam-
ple has not been; chosen  by chance.  ·It represents in  fat;t  the most mature  and 
satisfactory solution so  far  adopted;  even  so·it does not fully meet there-
quirements  laid down  in  the  Community Treaties. 
Because this conference was  convened under  the auspices  of the United 
Nations,  the USSR  delegation  stressed at the  opening of its proceedings,  that 
the  UN  was  an  or·.ganization of States  so  that the EEC,  as  an  inter-governmental 
body,  could not participate in the  conference proceedings with voting rights. 
The  Secretary-Ge~eral of the conference,  acting·on an  opinion of the  UN  legal 
adviser observed'that 
1the  special case of the  EEC  presented new  and  for  the 
time being  uniqu~ constitutional aspects which  a  conference  on  a  primary com-
modity could usefully recognize in order  to facilitate the  achievement of its 
aims'.  He  added  that  'the EEC  representative might be given  a  rather differ-
ent status  from that of a  simple  observer  although  less important  than  that 
of a  full State,  in order  to enable him  to participate in  the negotiations'. 
The  conference  did not object to  these observations  and  the participation of 
the  Community  was  agreed  on  this basis. 
But the  problem arose again when  the  agreement was  finalized.  The  Presi-
dent of the Conference  suggested inclusion in the text of the  agreement of a 
clause  to  enable all notifications to Member  States  under. ·the  terms  of the 
agreement to be  made  also to the EEC.  Without a  forma1  vote,  the participa-
tion of the  EEC  in the agreement was  thus regulated by an  eminently practical 
formula  which,  without infringing the principles laid down  in  the  United 
Nations Charter,  complied with the institutional provisions of the  Community 
even  though representatives of the Member  States acted side by side with  the 
Community delegation. 
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However  when it came  to  signature of  the agreement,  the  USSR  entered the 
following reservation:  'If the  EEC  adheres  to this  agreement,  participation 
by  the  USSR  in  the agreement must not be  deemed  to  imply  that the  USSR  recog-
nizes the  EECi  such participation implies no  obligation  on. the part of the 
USSR  vis-a-vis  the Community'. 
For  reasons unrelated to  the  above  facts,  the Community  did not in  the 
end  subscribe to the  sugar  agreement which nevertheless remains  the best exam-
ple of recognition  of the Community as  such at a  conference organized under 
UN  auspices. 
24.  As  can be  seen  from  the  above  example,  the  problem is not merely abstract 
and legal in nature but also political;  the political implications will be-
come  increasingly important as  the Community  grows  and develops,  with all the 
consequences  that process will entail. 
It is therefore essential to  find  suitable means  of persuading third 
countries  to recognize without restriction the negotiating capacity of the 
Community at  inte~national level in  those areas which are reserved exclusively 
for  it.  But before this can  be  done  the Member  States of the Community must. 
begin  t.c  respect the Community Treaties.  That has not been  the case hitherto. 
It. is to be hoped that the Court of Justice of the European  Communi ties will 
in future  be called upon  more  often to  ensure  full compliance with  the Trea-
ties.  It is, however,  also  true that this aim will be achieved all the more 
easily if the  UN  and  third countries accept this principle.· 
· 25.  These  countries have  a  direct interest in doing  so,  a.bove  all for  their 
own  legal security.·  If for  example  a  third country concludes  an  individual 
agreement with  a  Member  State of the Community  on  customs  duties it will have 
dealt with a  party which is not entitled to negotiate;  this country cannot 
have  any  legal certainty that the  agreement will be  respected by the other 
contracting party since the Community is the  sole competent legal party in 
the matter.  It is the.:r;efore  in  the interest of third countries  to deal  direc-
tly with  the  Community  in cases where it has  sole  competence. 
Having  said this,  the only legally satisfactory solution would consist 
in recognition of  the Community's  capacity as  a  contracting party in its own 
right. 
26.  In  the specific case with which  we  are concerned here,  i.e.  dealings 
with  the  UN,  it is neQessary  to ascertain whether  the United Nations  Charter 
really does  allow  a  solution of this kind.  If it does,  there will  not be  any 
insurmountable  problems.  If it does  not,  it will be  necessary to try to have 
the  United Nations  Charter  amended. 
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But can  the  appropriate  adjustments be  made  to  the  UN  Charter  ?  This 
possibility certainly exists  since  the  Community  countrie~;~,  supported by 
many  Associated States  and  friendly countries  or  others entertaining 
special relations with  the  Community,  could easily .obtain  the  necessary 
majority in the  UN Assembly1 . 
27.  The  practical criteria laid down  hitherto in the  UN ·o.r  it-s- bodies 
show  that even  this  measure  would  not be absolutely essential.  However, 
there is reason  to believe that the  Member  States of the  community have 
so  far lacked  the  political will to clarify the matter once  and  for all. 
consequently  the European  Parliament  should  urge  the  governments  of 
Member  States to deal with this problem jointly and  adopt  a  clear and 
precise position. 
- . 
IV.  Discussion within  the Legal Affairs  Committee 
28.  In view of  the delicate nature of the  subject matter,  the  examination 
of the present report was  not without. its difficulties  .. 
29.  In particular,  a  number of the members  of your  committee would  have 
preferred  to  see paragraph  6  of the motion  for  a  resolution deleted, 
deeming it inappropriate to accuse  the  council  of  the  European  Communities 
of  lacking political  sensibility~ they  also felt that the  emphasis __ should 
be  laid mainly,  if not entirely,  on  the _problems  of a  legal nature. 
However,  the  request that paragraph  6  be deleted was  rejected,  with only 
five  votes  in  favour,  eight against and  four  abstentions..  In its majority 
your  committee  thus ·took  the  view  that,  although  there are  indeed problems 
of a  legal nature. that originate outside  the  Community,  it is impossible  _to 
gloss  over  the fact that the  solution of those  problems  has been delayed 
mainly by  the  lack of political resolve  shown  so  far by  Member  States. 
A proposal  for  a  compromise whereby  equal weight would  be  given  to the 
legal  problems  and  the Member  States'  lack of political resolve was  also 
rejected by five votes  in  favour,  five against and  six abs-tentions. 
30.  It was  also proposed  that the last sentence  in paragraph  7  of the 
motion  for  a  resolution,  concerning  the  referral, if necessary,  of the 
question  to the United Nations Assembly,  be deleted in view .of  the 
difficulties  th~t would  arise in that eventuality.  This  request was  like-
wise  rejected,  one  vote only being cast in favour  and  nine  against;  there 
were  five  abstentions. 
1 
LE  TALLEC,  Rapports  entre la CEE  et les organisations internationa1es.  Lec-
ture to the Institut du  Droit de  la paix et du  d~veloppememt of Nice  Univer-
sity on  5  May  1972 
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the  Danish  member  of your  committee  explained his abstention by  referring  to 
the possible effects Community  action in this  field could have  on  Denmark•s 
relations with the other countries of  the Nordic  Union.· 
v.  Conclusions 
32  ~  To·  sum  up,  your· committee notes  that a  number  of. problems have arisen 
and will certainly· arise in  future  in regard to participation by  the. Community 
in the work of the .UN  on matters which  come  under  the sole responsibility of 
the community. 
It feels that on  these particular matters  the Member  States no  longer. 
have  the right to contract unilateral obligations,  which  they could not in 
any case respect,  and that the  time has  now  come  to move  beyond compromise 
solutions. 
lt also considers that it is in the interest of third countries,  for 
their own  legal. security,  to deal in these specific instances with the Com-
munity as  such~  Finally, it believes that the UN  Charter  does  not categori-
cally preclude participation by the Community  in the work of the  UN  and its 
bodies. 
33.  But,  in the opinion of your  committee, if an  arrangement satisfactory to 
the Community has not yet been  reached,  this is due primarily to  the lack of 
political will in the Member  States.  The  latter must therefore take energe-
tic steps if third countries raise objections to participation by the Com-
munity in  tlle work of the  UN~  On~ possible course of action would be to  set 
in motion the procedure for  amending  the United Nations Charter if this should· 
become  necessary. 
An  amendment of this kind would probably arouse  less. hostility than  in 
the past,  because· of the changes which have  taken place in the world politi-
cal  situation~  The  People•s Republic  of China,  which  only recently became  a 
member  of the United Nations organization but  neverthele~s carries consider-
able we;i.ght,  has  several  times  expressed,  for  weighty reasons of general 
policy,  real ip..terest in the European Community.  · The  Soviet Union, 
which  in  the past was  the most intransigent supporter of the national  per~ 
s~nality.of UN  members,  has recently shown  significant signs· of an  inclina-
tion  to treat the European Community as  a  single entity.· 
Without creating the  dangerous  illusion that a  solution is easy to reach, 
it seems reasonable  t~ take  into account these  facts which may  help  - provided 
the Member  States  themselves  show  full  support_ for  the Community  - to bring 
this problem nearer  to its solution. 
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